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NOTES

MR. SMITH COMES HOME: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION
OF OPENNESS IN LOCAL LEGISLATIVE MEETINGS*

Every state requires by statute that local legislative meet-

ings be open to the public. This requirement allows citizens to
receive information that will enable informed decisionmaking.
It provides a forum conducive to the resolution of issues of
public concern and affecting municipal life. Finally, it creates a
tangible link between city government and the citizenry, ensuring political accountability.In some cases, however, these openmeeting requirements, often riddled with exceptions, have been
circumvented. The Author proposes that the courts recognize a

constitutional presumption of openness in local legislative
meetings, grounded in the first amendment.
A DEMOCRATIC society to succeed, its citizens must
have the requisite knowledge for responsible self-government.
Depending on the type of democracy, this knowledge can be converted into action in a variety of ways. In a "pure" democracy',
knowledge is converted directly into legislation as each citizen actively participates in the debate and voting of the "town meeting".
In a republican democracy, knowledge is converted into votes for
the representative who will best act as the citizen's proxy in governmental decisions.' However, the republican citizen is not
merely limited to periodically voting for his representative; the citizen can also petition the government directly; write to newspapers
and journals; contribute to funds and committees; campaign for a

FOR

* The author thanks Professor Jonathan L. Entin of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law for his guidance and encouragement in shaping this Note.
1. "[A] pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person .
THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 67 (J. Madison) (R. Dunne ed. 1901).
2. "A republic by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation
takes place ..
" Id.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:227

referendum, ballot issue, or candidate; advertise political preferences in the media; participate in demonstrations, protests and
boycotts; or, of course, run for office himself. American republicanism offers opportunities for citizen participation in public issues which are different from, though not necessarily inferior to,
the role of the citizen in a "pure" democracy.
Yet a citizen cannot effectively travel any of these avenues of
participatory self-government without access to governmental deliberation. The right to vote is a hollow right if one is barred from
learning about the records of the candidates. One cannot support
or object to who is representing him, if he does not know how he is
being represented. Likewise, public advocacy through petition, editorial, or advertisement fails if the public official who opposes
such advocacy has access to superior knowledge based on information at least temporarily barred from the common citizen. But in a
government, "of the people, for the people, and by the people," 3
the citizen has not relinquished all power to the representatives.
By definition, democratic power remains in the citizens, 4 and to
exercise that power responsibly, the citizen needs knowledge. Otherwise, either the government will stagnate into a self-perpetuating class of political aristocrats who control the legislative agenda,
or citizens will respond blindly through ballot retribution against
all incumbents, a method of franchise finesse akin to shooting fish
in a barrel. Such a response may instigate change, but not necessarily assure that the best qualified proxies are maintained in
office.
To govern effectively, citizens must be guaranteed access to
the deliberations of legislative bodies. Although the courts have
yet to address the issue of constitutional protection to the public's
right to attend city council meetings, judicial inroads have been
made. In a line of cases beginning in 1943 with Martin v.
Struthers,5 the Supreme Court recognized that the freedom to discuss novel and unconventional ideas necessarily protects the right
of the public to receive those ideas.' In determining what speech is
protected for the listener, subsequent cases have focused on the
quality of speech and its impact on the public's ability to self-

3.

4.

A. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, (November 19, 1863).

OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 169 (1980) (Democracy - "Government by the
whole people of the country, especially through representatives whom they elect.").
5. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
6. Id. at 143.
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govern.7 Yet nothing affects the public's ability to govern its own
affairs more significantly than the legislative process, and the role
of its representatives in the formulation of law and allocation of
the public money. If the right to receive doctrine protects political
speech 8 so that it can reach the citizens who will evaluate the merits of the speech in their role and duty as self-governors, then the
public must surely have a right to receive the information most
central to the democratic process, government deliberations.
A right to public knowledge of government deliberations is
therefore necessary for effective government. The right, however,
is a qualified one: certain matters are too sensitive to be debated
openly before the public for fear of ruining personal reputations,
creating economic damage, even endangering lives. Yet the quality and quantity of these exceptions diminish as one moves from
federal to state to local government. Questions of national security, foreign relations, and troop movements, for instance, give way
to exceptions based on local issues such as real estate transactions
and personnel matters. Conversely, the citizen's need for government information may well be strongest at the local level, since it
is there that legislation most immediately and directly affects him.
Moreover, the checks on secrecy that exist at the federal level (national media, interest groups, party machinery) are often unavailable to the citizen trying to divine the content of local
deliberations.
The need for a public right of access to government deliberations has been recognized by the Founding Fathers, commentators, and the states themselves. Beginning in 1898, the states began passing open meetings laws known as sunshine laws, designed
to prevent municipalities from closing their meetings to the public.9 In 1976, New York joined the other forty-nine states and the
District of Columbia and codified its commitment to open
government.10

7. These cases deal with the right to receive information, which ultimately results in
the ability to self-govern, despite the fact that such speech may be considered libelous or
dangerous. See infra notes 109-153 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
9. Note, Common Cause v. Utah Public Service Commission - The Applicability of
Open-Meeting Legislation to Quasi-JudicialBodies, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 829, 835 (citing
1898 Utah Laws § 202).
Most state open-meeting statutes create enumerated exceptions for closed executive
sessions. See infra notes 182-90 and accompanying text.
10. Sluzar, New York Abandons a Commitment to Open Meetings, 50 ALB. L. REV.
613, 613 (1986) (citing Open Meetings Law, ch. 511, 1976 N.Y. Laws (codified as

230
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Though the state sunshine laws have proven that there is a

national consensus on the need for public access to local government, 1 ' many states have not enforced their own sunshine laws.
The local citizen may find that if access to local government is cut
off through closed city meetings, recourse to the state is no longer

sufficient. State courts are reading broader exceptions into their
open meeting statutes, and state legislatures are amending those

statutes to shield their own deliberations.

2

Despite the existence of these state laws, the federal govern-

ment must not shirk its responsibility as the primary guarantor of
American citizens' civil rights.' 3 Because the state political ma-

chinery may prove deficient, the federal Constitution must provide
a safeguard for open government based on substantive and structural support.

In a line of cases' 4 beginning in 1980 with Richmond News-

papers, Inc. v. Virginia,'5 the Supreme Court recognized that the
first amendment provides a substantive right of public access to

criminal trials.'" The Court emphasized the public's need to be
informed of the functioning of its government.' 7 This reasoning
can be applied even more persuasively to access to local govern-

ment meetings. Moreover, there is a structural argument that inherent in the Constitution's republican form of government, and
necessary for its survival, is the right of the citizen to be informed
of government deliberations. This right is only effective through
direct access to those deliberations.

Where there is a federal right, there must be a federal remedy, otherwise the right is meaningless. Such a remedy is neces-

sary to provide the local citizen with an incentive and an opportuamended at N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW §§ 100-11 (McKinney 1988)) [hereinafter Sluzar].
11. Note, The Personnel Matters Exception to the Mississippi Open Meetings Act A Cloud Over the Sunshine Law, 7 Miss. C. L. REV. 181, 185 (1987) (Open meetings laws
now exist in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.).
12. See infra notes 182-90 and accompanying text.
13. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe upheld the enforcement of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (a civil action for the deprivation of rights) against policemen for an
illegal search and seizure, despite the availability of state criminal and tort remedies. "The
third aim [of the statute] was to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
adequate in theory, was not available in practice." Id. at 174.
14. See infra notes 38-85 and accompanying text.
15. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
16. Id. at 580.
17. "These expressly guaranteed [first amendment] freedoms share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government." Id. at 575.
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nity, not always available via the state laws, to challenge a city
that closes its doors to its own citizens. Only recognition of a constitutional presumption of openness in local meetings " 'assures
the maintenance of our political system and open society,' and
secures 'the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning the public officials.' "18
This Note argues that the time is ripe for the judiciary to
articulate the principle that there is a constitutional presumption
that local legislative meetings should be open to the public. Part I
examines Supreme Court prison and criminal trial access cases
which have established that the press has no greater right of access to governmental organs than does the public, but that the
public does have a guaranteed right of access to certain government deliberations. Part II focuses on the local legislative process,
and argues that municipal council meetings fit into the category of
government deliberations for which the public must be guaranteed
access. Part III analyzes the advantages of a right of access
founded in constitutional principles instead of a right of access
granted by state sunshine laws.
I. THE RIGHT OF AccEss CASES
Major Supreme Court decisions regarding the public's right
of access to government institutions fall into two distinct groups.
The first series of cases dealt with access to prisons; the second set
of cases analyzed access to criminal trials.
A.

Access to Prisons

In the mid-1970's, members of the press initiated a number
of suits which challenged certain restrictions on media access to
jails, penitentiaries, and incarcerated criminals. The central issue
was whether freedom of the press guaranteed the media greater
access to areas under governmental authority than the access permitted to the normal citizen.
In the 1974 companion cases of Saxbe v. Washington Post
20
both decided on the same day, the
Co.' 9 and Pell v. Procunier,
challenges to federal and
amendment
Supreme Court rejected first

18.
374, 389
19.
20.

Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
(1967) and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964)).
417 U.S. 843 (1974).
417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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state policies prohibiting personal interviews by the press with designated inmates. In opinions by Justice Stewart, the Court empha-

sized that effective alternative means of acquiring information
about the conditions of the prisons were available to the press.2

Because information was not completely inaccessible, interviews
with designated inmates could be prohibited due to the government's overriding interest in maintaining security and peace

within the facilities.22
Four years later, the Court rejected a similar claim in
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.23 In KQED, a broadcaster claimed that
he had a constitutional right of access to all parts of a county jail,
including those areas where access was denied to the general public. As in Washington Post Co. and Procunier,the Court denied
the claim, basing its decision on the availability of alternative avenues for learning about conditions in the jail.24
Attempts have been made to interpret these cases as a denial

of any first amendment right of access to government information. 25 However, the prison access cases state the more limited
proposition that the first amendment does not provide the press
with a greater right of access to government information than that
provided to the general public.2 6 Even in their broadest terms,

these cases merely report that the "Court has never intimated a
First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of

information within government control."' 27 Even the most aggressive libertarian acknowledges that some types of government in-

formation must be withheld from the public - thus the use of the
term "a presumption of openness."2 " Moreover, any possible
broader interpretations of Court language in these cases could

only be considered dicta, since the plaintiffs were news media rep21. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 847-48; Procunier, 417 U.S. at 830.
22. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 848-49; Procunier, 417 U.S. at 831-32.
23. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
24. Id. at 15.
25. See id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The First and Fourteenth Amendments
do not guarantee the public a right of access to information generated or controlled by
government .... "); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 404 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) ("[lt is clear that this Court repeatedly has held that there is no First
Amendment right of access in the public or the press to judicial or other governmental
proceedings.").
26. KQED. Inc., 438 U.S. at 16; Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 850; Procunier,
417 U.S. at 834-35.
27. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
28. See Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know", 75
HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1204 & n.36 (1962) [hereinafter Open Meetings].
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resentatives,20 and the holdings were explicitly narrow.3 0 As stated
in KQED, "[t]he question presented is whether the news media
have a constitutional right of access to a county jail, over and
above that of other persons . ... "-1
Despite the plaintiffs lack of success in the prison access
cases, the majority opinions nonetheless emphasized the importance of a citizenry informed of governmental affairs.32 In the case
of prisons, "[i]t is . . . true that with greater information, the
public can more intelligently form opinions about prison conditions."3 3 Therefore, in order to justify denial of public access, in
all three cases the Court had to find effective alternative methods
which enabled the public to learn about prison conditions.3 4
In his Washington Post dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, felt that the alternative methods of
information gathering relied on by the majority, such as written
correspondence with prisoners and random interviews during supervised tours, were insufficient:35
What is at stake here is the societal function of the First
Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental
affairs. No aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more
rightly treasured than its protection of the ability of our people
through free and open debate to consider and resolve their own
destiny. As the Solicitor General made the point, "[t]he First
Amendment is one of the vital bulwarks of our national commitment to intelligent self-government." It embodies our Nation's
commitment to popular self-determination and our abiding faith
that the surest course for developing sound national policy lies in
a free exchange of views on public issues. And public debate
must not only be unfettered; it must also be informed. For that
reason this Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment

29. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 3; Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 844; Procunier,

417 U.S. at 819 (a claim by four prison inmates was disposed of separately.
30.

KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 15-16 ("[Tihe media have no special right of access to

[a jail] different from or greater than that accorded the public generally."); Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 850 ("[N]ewsmen have no constitutional rights of access to
prisons or their inmates beyond that offered the general public." (quoting Procunier, 417

U.S. at 834)); Procunier, 417 U.S. at 834 ("The Constitution does not, however, require
government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the
public generally." (footnote omitted)).
31. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 3.
32. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 8; Procunier, 417 U.S. at 832.

33. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 8.
34. See id. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35.

Washington Post Co., at 853-56 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas as well
as the right of free expression."

Powell emphasized that, because of the importance of the constitutional issues at stake, the state had a heavier burden to justify
the various prohibitions than mere "discretionary authority and
administrative convenience.""

In the area of access to criminal

trials, Powell's logic would eventually persuade a majority of the
Court.
B.

Access to Judicial Proceedings

The cases which dealt with closed criminal trials and hearings eventually led to the Court's recognition of a first amendment
right of public access to government deliberations. Ironically, the
initial case focused primarily on the sixth amendment guarantee

of a fair and public trial. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,38 the
Court held that the sixth amendment affords only the defendant,
and not the public in general, a right to a public trial.3 9 If the
defendant wants to waive his right to a public trial in the interest
of a fair trial, he may do so, though he cannot arbitrarily demand
a private trial.4 0 The failure of the Blackmun dissenters to prevail
on their argument that the sixth amendment guarantees the pub-

lic a right to attend open trials would lead them to embrace the
first amendment argument in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.

36. Id. at 862-63 (Powell, J.,dissenting) (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting).
38. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). In Gannett, a newspaper brought suit under the first, sixth,
and fourteenth amendments to enjoin the closure of a pretrial suppression hearing. The
closure motion was supported by the defendants and the prosecution, and at the time the
motion was made, the newspaper reporter made no objection. Id. at 375.
39. Id. at 381.
40. Id. at 382.
Though Justice Stewart's majority opinion would not commit to recognizing a first
amendment public right of access to pretrial hearings, Justice Stewart declared, arguendo,
that if such a right did exist, it was outweighed in the instant case by the interests of a fair
and impartial trial under the sixth amendment. Id. at 392-93. Since most of the other
Justices, both concurring and dissenting, felt that this was primarily a sixth amendment
case, they felt no need to reach the first amendment issues. E.g., id. at 447 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Predictably, only Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
in concurring opinions, tackled the first amendment argument directly. Justice Powell asserted that a public right of access was implicated, but agreed with the Stewart majority
that it was outweighed by sixth amendment concerns. Id. at 397, 402-03 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist maintained that there was no such right of access under either
amendment. Id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
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Virginia.41
In Richmond Newspapers, a plurality held that the public
did have a right to attend criminal trials, but that the right was
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. The facts of
Richmond Newspapers are similar to Gannett: the defendant
moved for closure of the trial, which was supported by the prosecution and the judge, and the press made no objection at the time
of the motion.42
Despite the similarities, the two cases can be distinguished.
In contrast to Gannett, later that same day the Richmond Newspapers plaintiff sought and received a hearing on a motion to vacate the closure order; the motion to vacate was denied.4 3 Moreover, while Gannett involved closure of a pretrial suppression
hearing, Richmond Newspapers involved closure of the trial itself.44 Lastly, although no alternative methods to closure were
available in Gannett, the trial judge in Richmond Newspapers did
not even inquire into possible alternatives to assure a fair trial.45
In recognizing a public right of access, the Court emphasized
the self-government objective underlying the first amendment.
"These expressly guaranteed . . . [freedoms of the first amend-

ment] share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government."46 Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion did recognize the
possibility of an overriding state interest in closure, but mandated
that such an interest would have to be articulated in findings, with

41. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). In Richmond Newspapers, both Justice White and Justice
Blackmun repeated their beliefs that the sixth amendment guarantees open trials. This

position was rejected by a majority of the Court. Therefore, Justices White and Blackmun
were forced to embrace as a "secondary protection" the first amendment arguments in

Richmond. Richmond Newspapers Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 603-04 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Id. at 581-82 (White, J.,concurring).
42. Id. at 560.
43. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. 561.

44. In addition, the closure order in Richmond Newspapers did not articulate reasons for the closure. Id at 584 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 564. Since the Gannett judge inquired into less restrictive alternatives to
closure in order to protect the defendant's rights, but found none available, id. at 580, it is
possible that closure there would have survived the strict scrutiny test employed by the
Court after Richmond Newspapers and its progeny. See infra notes 66-85 and accompanying text. However, the Richmond Newspapers trial judge failed to inquire into less restric-

tive alternatives and therefore failed to prove a compelling state interest in closure. Id. at
580-81.

46. Id. at 575.
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no less-restrictive alternatives available.41 In a sense, then, state

closure orders had to survive a case-by-case strict-scrutiny test. In
the instant case, the plurality held that both findings and a search

for less-restrictive means were lacking.

8

Justice Brennan's concurrence has become the most cited

opinion from Richmond Newspapers. In it, Brennan developed a
two-pronged test which has since been applied by the Court in

criminal access cases. For Brennan, there are "two helpful principles" in determining a presumption of openness.49 First, special
weight is given when an argument for access is drawn from an
"enduring and vital tradition," and second, public access to a particular process must be important to the functioning of that
process. 50
Perhaps the main reason that Brennan's concurrence is so

frequently cited is due to the detail with which he explains the

47. Id. at 580-81.
48. Id. at 581. Chief Justice Burger detailed various policy reasons for allowing public access to criminal trials: it promotes public confidence in the fairness of government, id.
at 570-71; assures that procedures are followed and deviations are discovered, id. at 569;
and provides a safety valve to allay the frustrations of those who feel that the government
is not doing its job, id. at 571-72.
Chief Justice Burger also emphasized the historical aspect of openness in criminal
trials, and concluded that the first amendment guarantees a public right of access to government institutions traditionally open to the public. Id. at 580.
49. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Despite subsequent application of the two-prong
test in later cases, see infra notes 66-85 and accompanying text, a close reading of the
Brennan concurrence shows that a tradition of openness is not requiredin order to find a
presumption of openness. Brennan's test merely states that an historical tradition, as well
as public value, must be consideredin determining whether the public's interest outweighs
the state's interest in limiting access. Id. Thus, Brennan's use of a tradition of openness is
to provide extra support for the second, more important prong of his test, the value of
access. (See Justice Stevens' dissent in Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court of CaL for
the County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise II]. Justice Stevens, after asserting that the Court majority had failed to find sufficient evidence of a
tradition of open preliminary hearings in criminal trials, declared, "[tihe Court's historical
crutch cannot carry the weight of opening a preliminary proceeding that the State has
ordered closed; that determination must stand or fall on whether it satisfies the second
component of the Court's test." Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The first prong is useful in that tradition implies recognition of the values of access by
those in control of the institutions in question. Presumably, reasons for openness in a particular government forum might be so valuable to the public interest, that the second prong
alone will outweigh the state's interest in closure, and a finding of historical tradition will
be unnecessary. Certainly, Justice Brennan would not abide by the idea that if a particular
institution either disregarded or undervalued the public's interest in access, its actions alone
would permanently bar the public. In practice, then, Brennan's two-pronged test is really a
balancing test between a state's interests and the public's interest, with tradition acting
merely as an institutional concession of an important public interest in access.
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application of his "two helpful principles." For example, Brennan
articulates why a tradition of openness is helpful: it implies the
"favorable judgment of experience."'" In determining whether a
past practice of openness for a particular process constitutes an
American tradition, Brennan looked at its roots in the common
law heritage,52 its colonial usage, 53 contemporaneous state usage
(both in state constitutions and statutes),54 and the Court's own
history of protecting the public quality of the particular process.55
These factors combine to reflect "a profound judgment about the
56
way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.1
In determining the importance of openness to the functioning
of a particular government organ, Brennan looked at a number of
factors: 1) the degree in which openness and publicity acted as a
necessary check and balance,57 2) the degree to which public scrutiny would help the citizens maintain control over the particular
process, 58 3) the necessity of openness for maintaining public confidence in its government, 59 4) the fact-finding role of openness in
providing more views and information to the particular institution, 0 and 5) the truthfinding role of openness where the threat of
publicity discourages falsehood."' Also, Brennan looked at the effect of a particular organ's actions upon the public in general.
"Under our system, judges are not mere umpires, but, in their
own sphere, lawmakers - a coordinate branch of government.
While individual cases turn upon the controversies between parties, or involve particular prosecutions, court rulings impose official and practical consequences upon members of society at
large."62

Like the Chief Justice, Justice Brennan also emphasized the
structural role of the first amendment: "Implicit in this structural
role is not only 'the principle that debate on public issues should

51. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
52. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 590 (Brennan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 590-91 (Brennan, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 591-92 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 155 (1968)).

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

592, 596 (Brennan, J., concurring).
593 (Brennan, J., concurring).
594-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
596 (Brennan, J., concurring).
597 (Brennan, J., concurring).
595 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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be uninhibited, robust and wide-open,' but also the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate - as well as other civic behavior - must be informed."" a

Justice Stevens recognized with approval that such first
amendment concerns were not limited to the judiciary. "Today,
however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an
arbitrary interference with access to important information is an
abridgment of the freedom of speech and of the press protected by
the First Amendment. ' '6 4 Justice Stevens further commented that
the first amendment protects the public's access to information,
"about the operation of their government, including the Judicial
Branch .

".6.."5

In subsequent cases, the Court has continued to apply the
Brennan's Richmond Newspapers test to various aspects of criminal trials. One example is Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court
for the County of Norfolk66 which involved a state statute mandating the closing of a trial during the testimony of a minor complainant in a sex crime. Justice Brennan, now representing the
majority, began his opinion by emphasizing the structural importance of free, informed discussion of government affairs in republican self-government. 67 Since Globe, like Richmond Newspapers,
involved a type of criminal trial, Brennan then repeated the historical and functional analysis for public access with the same result:
the tradition and utility of openness for criminal trials creates a
constitutional presumption of public access.68 Such a presumption
can only be overcome by an "overriding interest articulated in
findings,"6 9 or as he now defined it, by a "compelling governmental interest" where closure "is narrowly tailored to serve that in-

63. Id. at 587. (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).

64. Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 584 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
66. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
67. Id. at 604-05. Underlying the first amendment right of access to criminal trials is
the common understanding that "a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
By offering such protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government . . . . Thus to the extent that the First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to ensure that this constitutionally
protected "discussion of governmental affairs" is an informed one.
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605.
68. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605-06.
69. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
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terest."70 However, since Globe involved a different kind of criminal trial than Richmond Newspapers, the state's interests in
closure had to be analyzed anew. 7 ' Brennan recognized the compelling state interests in protecting minor victims of sex crimes
from further trauma and embarrassment, and in encouraging victims to come forward to testify.72 Nevertheless, the Court found
that mandatory denial of public access in every such case was too
broad a remedy to be permissible, especially in light of alternative
means.7 3 The availability of a case by case determination, coupled
with the opportunity for in camera conferences to screen out potentially embarrassing information, were less restrictive alternatives to mandatory closure.7 4 Even in such case-by-case determinations, representatives of the public and press must be allowed to
argue for open proceedings. 5
A public right of access was extended to voir dire examinations of prospective jurors in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court of California(Press-Enterprise1).76 Unlike the Globe opinion, which repeated the theory of structural and historical/functional justifications for open trials without applying the test to specific facts, Justice Burger's Press-EnterpriseI opinion re-applied
the Richmond test by focusing specifically on the historical and
functional aspects of public jury selection." This new application
implied that voir dire proceedings are analytically different than
criminal trials for first amendment public access purposes, thereby
extending the public access doctrine beyond the Richmond/Globe
trial settings.
The implication of the majority opinion was made explicit by
Justice Steven's concurrence, which asserted that a definition of
"trial" would be important if this were a sixth amendment case,
"[b]ut the distinction between trials and other official proceedings
is not necessarily dispositive, or even important, in evaluating the
First Amendment issues."' 8 Press Enterprise I thus left the door
open for application of the two-prong test for public access outside

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607.
Id. at 605 n.13.
Id. at 607-10.
Id. at 609 & n.25.
Id.
Id.
464 U.S. 501 (1984).
Id. at 505-10.
Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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of the courtroom setting. The Court found that the important
state interests in protecting the privacy of jurors could be protected through means less restrictive than closure, such as in camera conferences. If necessary, partial closure could then be ordered for the particular juror's testimony, followed by release of a
public transcript, either complete or edited in camera.7 9 The availability of less restrictive alternatives reduced the state's compelling interest for closure. Consequently, the right of access doctrine
was extended to the voir dire process.
The first amendment right of access was extended next to
preliminary criminal hearings. Both closed preliminary criminal
hearings and sealed transcripts were challenged in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-EnterpriseII).80
Although the Court often equated preliminary hearings to criminal trials, which had already been established as "open," the
Court nonetheless examined the historical usage and functional
utility of pretrial hearings, independent of the trial itself.81 Finding that a public right of access did extend to preliminary criminal hearings,"2 the Court then looked to see if California could
justify closure through a compelling state interest. The California
Supreme Court had affirmed the Superior Court's finding that the
particular criminal defendant (a male nurse charged with twelve
murders) would be prejudiced by the release of the pretrial tran83
script in violation of his sixth amendment right to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court of the United States stressed that the test
applied by the lower courts did not give adequate weight to first
amendment interests. The Supreme Court replaced the "reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice" test with a stricter test "substantial probability" that a defendant may be prejudiced. The
Court held that the record did not show a "substantial
probability" of prejudice that would justify closure.8 4 In addition,
the Supreme Court noted that the state court failed to consider

79. Id. at 512.
80. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
81. Id. at 10-13.
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id. at 14. At issue was the California courts' refusal to release the transcripts
after the preliminary hearing, but before the trial. Ultimately, the defendant waived his
right to a jury trial, and the transcript was released. However, the Supreme Court of the
United States avoided potential mootness concerns and reviewed the initial refusal to release the transcripts, based on the doctrine that such a practice was "capable of repetition,
yet evading review." Id. at 6.
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alternatives to closure that would protect the defendant's interest
in a fair trial.8 5 Press-EnterpriseII thus stands for the proposition
that in the face of a presumed public right of access, even a sixth
amendment justification for closure will not be considered a compelling state interest unless it is substantiated through articulated
findings and an absence of less restrictive means.
II. AccEss

TO LEGISLATIVE BODIES

When the Court's public access rationale is applied to local
legislative deliberations, it becomes evident that open meetings are
integral both to the success of the municipal legislative process
and to the proper functioning of democratic government in general. This section will demonstrate not only how the practice of
open city meetings fulfills the historical and functional prongs of
the Richmond/Globe access test, but also how it helps to maintain
the structural integrity of American self-government.
A. The Tradition of Open Meetings
In determining whether a tradition of openness exists for a
particular activity, Justice Brennan's Richmond Newspapers opinion looked at the common law heritage, colonial usage, contemporaneous state usage, and the Supreme Court's history of protecting the public quality of the activity."6 The Court has
subsequently relaxed the degree of inquiry required to satisfy the
historical prong. In Press-Enterprise11,87 the Court traced the
tradition of openness for preliminary hearings of criminal trials to
the Aaron Burr trial of 180788 without relying on the common law
heritage and usage at the time of the Constitutional Convention.
The Court instead focused on whatever historical evidence would
' Nonetheless, the
reveal "the favorable judgment of experience." 89
practice of opening legislative meetings to the public has been suf85.

Id. at 14-15.

86. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
87.

Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).

88. Id. at 10.
89.

Id. at 11 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of

Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982)). See also Brief for Common Cause/Ohio and the
ACLU of Cleveland Found., as amici curiae at 8, 9, WJW-TV, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,
878 F.2d 906 (6th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-3341) [hereinafter Brief] (In their brief, amici argue that restricting the scope of first amendment guarantees to those that existed at the
time of the framing of the Constitution would repudiate "virtually the entire corpus of

First Amendment jurisprudence."), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 74 (1989).
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ficiently prevalent in our tradition to pass even the stricter Richmond Newspapers test.
1. The Common Law Heritage and the Founding Fathers

A tradition of open legislative meetings can be found prior to
the Revolution at both the national and local levels. For example,
meetings of Parliament were open to the public.9" In addition,
meetings of local legislative bodies have been open to American

and Colonial citizens since the seventeenth century. 91 Indeed, city
councils are direct descendants of the colonial town meeting,

which in turn descended from the English and colonial folkmoots.9 2 The Supreme Court has traced the tradition of open

criminal trials to these very same folkmoots.9 a A shared characteristic of folkmoots and town meetings was the emphasis on public
attendance and participation; in most council localities, attendance was compulsory. 94
Despite the fact that the Constitutional Convention was

closed to the public, 95 Founding Fathers such as Jefferson and
Madison were explicit in their desire that legislative meetings be

open to the public.96 In addition, the public's interest in government information was constitutionalized in the journal of proceedings clause of Article 1.91 In 1790, deliberations of the House of
90. Brief, supra note 89, at 9.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id.
93. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court of Cal. for the County of Riverside, 464 U.S.
501, 505-06 (1984) (Press Enterprise I). See also Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(noting that before the Norman Conquest criminal cases were brought before moots);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1980) (same).
94. Brief, supra note 89, at 10.
95. The Constitutional Convention, though closed, did offer procedural safeguards
which diminished some of the dangers of closure. Delegates had no authority to do more
than propose amendments, which were then submitted to state conventions, where, "tense
battles" ensued over ratification. A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 35 (1987).
It has been argued that because of the secrecy of the convention, the FederalistPapers had
to be written to help achieve acceptance. Open Meetings, supra note 28, at 1202 n.18.
Despite the safeguards of the ratification procedure, Thomas Jefferson rued the closure:
"Nothing can justify this example but the innocence of their intentions, and ignorance of
the value of public discussions." Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CALIF.
L. REV. 889, 896 n.29 (1986) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug.
30, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 194, 196 (L. Cappon ed. 1959)).
96. For Jefferson's views, see infra notes 155, 172-75 and accompanying text. For
Madison's views, see infra note 160 and accompanying text. For the views of another
founding father, James Wilson, see infra note 158 and accompanying text.
97. "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time
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Representatives were opened to reporters; two years later, the
8
9
Senate followed suit.

The practice of open meetings evolved from English folk-

moots and the example of Parliament; it was then embraced in
America through the town meeting and a 200 year history of an

open Congress. Though the practice has not been adopted in every
locality, 99 it nonetheless has been a common thread in our legislative history, coloring the fabric of our democratic process, and
passing the "favorable judgment" of time.
2. Contemporaneous State Usage
For further evidence of an historical affirmation of openness,
Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers looked to state usage

and state constitutions. 100 As mentioned above, all fifty states have

passed open meeting legislation. 101 In addition, thirty-four states

have constitutional requirements that their legislatures meet in
public. 102
* In addition to state usage, there is a federal policy of openness for rule-making bodies. Not only has that policy been demonstrated by an open Congress, but it has been codified to ensure

openness in federal administrative hearings through the Federal
Sunshine Act. 10 3 The Act not only mandates that all agency hearings be open to the public,10 4 but also provides for a procedural
framework which includes advance notice to the public for all
meetings.10 5 Like many state sunshine laws, 106 the Federal law re-

publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy .
U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl.3.
98. SEIBERT, THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE PRESS 58-59 (1970).
99. See Open Meetings supra note 28, at 1199.
100. "The earliest charters of colonial government expressly perpetuated the accepted practice of public trials . . . .Subsequently framed state constitutions also prescribed open trial proceedings." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
590-91 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring)
101. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
102. Open Meetings, supra note 28, at 1203.
103. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988)).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b) (1988).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(e)(1) (1988).
106. For example, the New York statute provides that:
It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that the public business
be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be
fully aware of and able to listen to the deliberation and decisions that go into the
making of public policy. The people must be able to remain informed if they are
to retain control over those who are their public servants. It is the only climate
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quires that agency meetings may be closed for certain enumerated
exceptions,10 7 but such closures must be explained in writing, 08
and transcripts of such meetings must be recorded to ensure that
the exceptions are not abused.' 09
While the focus on openness in common law criminal trials
was necessarily at the state level only, analysis of openness in legislative-type deliberations must be expanded to include federal as
well as state practices. The historical support for openness at both
state and federal levels lends even greater weight to the finding of
a "favorable judgment" for a public right of access to legislative
meetings.
3. Judicial Protection of the Public Character of Government
Information
In reviewing Supreme Court protection of the public character of the judicial process, Justice Brennan's Richmond Newspapers concurrence cited only one precedent which directly addressed open criminal trials." 0 In re Oliver"' established that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids closed
criminal trials." 2 The Court in Oliver focused on many of the
same historical and functional reasons for openness which it would
later look to in Richmond Newspapers"3 and its progeny, such as
the historical distrust of secrecy and the public check against possible governmental abuse of power." 4
Justice Brennan also looked to Supreme Court precedents upholding the right to report about judicial matters as evincing a
"special solicitude for the public character of judicial proceedings. 11 5 In reviewing these cases, Brennan pointed to their em-

under which the commonweal will prosper and enable the governmental process
to operate for the benefit of those who created it.
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100 (McKinney 1988).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (1988).

108.

5 U.S.C.

§ 552b(d)(3) (1988).

5 U.S.C. § 552b(f) (1988).
110. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-92 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
111. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
112. Id. at 266.
113. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 591-92 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
114. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266-71.
115. Id. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring).
109.
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phasis on the structural role of an open judicial system.116
It has been argued that the very purpose of first amendment
protection of free expression is to make the citizen more informed
and capable of self-government. 117 Indeed, the development of
first amendment doctrine has recognized not only the importance
in allowing the speaker to impart information or opinions about
governmental matters, but the right of the potential audience to
receive such information. This development can be traced through
the development of four areas of first amendment jurisprudence:
prior restraint, libel, political, and commercial/corporate speech.
i. Prior Restraint
Prior restraints are restraints on speech by a government
body or agent (such as through preliminary or permanent injunctions) prior to a fair judicial determination of whether the speech
is protected expression under the first amendment." 8 Central to
the doctrine against prior restraint is the fear that the government
in question (particularly the legislature or executive) can insulate
itself from criticism or competition through restrictions on critical
speech. 119 Thus, in Near v. Minnesota,2 0° a state statute which
enjoined any newspaper from printing truthful matters unless
published "with good motives and justifiable ends," was struck
down by the Court.121 The Court reasoned that if the statute was
upheld, "the legislature may provide machinery for determining in
the complete exercise of its discretion what are justifiable ends
and restrain publication accordingly. And
it would be but a step
22
to a complete system of censorship."'
The prior restraint doctrine culminated in the Court's per

116.

Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan acknowledged that such cases as

Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), Nebraska Press Ass'n.
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), and Cox Broadcasting, Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469

(1975), could be analyzed as prior restraint cases; however, "they are also bottomed upon a
keen appreciation of the structural interest served in opening the judicial system to public
inspection." Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559, cited in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
592 (Brennan, J., concurring).
117. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 1516, 24-27, 39 (1948); see also discussion of the structural role of open legislative meetings,
infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Association, 427 U.S. 539.
119. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931).
120. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
121. Id. at 702, 722-23.
122. Id. at 721.
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curiam decision in the Pentagon Papers case. 123 There, a confidential Defense Department study of Vietnam War policy, strategy,
and status, was leaked to the press; the government filed suit to
stop publication. Among the six justices who ruled against the
government injunction, three asserted that the government failed
to support a contention of inevitable, direct, and immediate
harm,' 24 and two believed a prior restraint could never issue for
matters critical or embarrassing to the government. 2 5 Perhaps the
most interesting facet of the Pentagon Papers case is the fact that
the Court conceded that the government did have statutory authority to prosecute those who possessed the papers without authorization. 126 Thus the Court's holding acted not so much to protect the speaker from government prosecution, but to insulate the
important governmental information from executive censorship,
and protect the rights of the citizens in receiving that
27
information.1
ii.

Libel

In libel cases, the Court has severely limited the states' power
to punish the speaker for false or disparaging comments regarding
government action. Hence, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"8
the Court prohibited Alabama from imposing civil liability for defamatory statements against a public official absent a showing of
actual malice (the court defined actual malice as knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard of whether or not the statement is
false). Although it was conceded that the Times may have been
negligent in running an advertisement without checking its accuracy against stories in its files,' 29 the Court found no presence of
actual malice. 130 The Court feared that allowing a stricter standard in defense of a libel accusation, such as a defense of truth,
123.
124.

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curium).
Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., joined by

White, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 723-24 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 735-40 (White, J., concurring). Congress gave the government authority
to protect documents of national security through 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1971). See id. at
737 n.8 (White, J., concurring).
127. For a subsequent prior restraint case, see Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976) (striking down a Nebraska court order prohibiting the pretrial publication
of any information "strongly implicative" of the accused).
128. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
129. Id. at 287-88.
130. Id.
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would cause a publisher to, "'steer far wider of the unlawful
zone.' [The stricter] rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the
variety of public debate."1 3 '
In Garrison v. Louisiana, 32 the Court extended the actual
malice rule to strike down a Louisiana statute for criminal defamation, as applied to criticism of public officials. The rule was
further extended in Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts and Associated
Press v. Walker'"3 to cover criticism or false statements concerning public figures who were not public officials.
Conversely, the Court reached a compromise standard for
false statements concerning private officials in public matters. In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.," the speaker of such statements
could be liable for compensatory damages upon a finding of negligence and knowledge that such a statement could be harmful to
its object's reputation. Nevertheless, in the case of a purely private party and a private matter, the common law standard of
strict liability for false statements still applies. 3 5
The Court's libel doctrine is consistent with the structural
purpose of the first amendment: the focus is on the subject matter
of the speech, and therefore the value of the speech to the public.
Information critical of government conduct receives the highest
protection for its speaker, since such information adds to the free
and open debate necessary for republican self-government.
Though private figures are afforded more protection, even in public matters, this is also consistent with a structural purpose, since
falsehoods pertaining to such individuals are less relevant to information regarding government conduct. Thus, first amendment libel jurisprudence focuses not on the speaker's conduct, since
speaker liability for falsehood or negligence will vary depending
on the type of information, but on the public's right to hear information relevant to its duty as self-governor.
iii.

Political Speech

The public interest in receiving political information was also
emphasized in cases concerning restrictions and regulations of the
political speech of broadcasters and corporations. In Red Lion

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 279 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
379 U.S. 64 (1964).
388 U.S. 130 (1967) (consolidated cases).
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
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Broadcastingv. F.C.C., a8 the Court upheld F.C.C. rules, known
collectively as the fairness doctrine, which required broadcasters
to supply equal air time to the subjects of personal attacks in controversial public issues, as well as the opponents of candidates endorsed through political editorials. A unanimous Court (Justice
Douglas not taking part) asserted that Congress had deemed it in
the "public interest" to impose a duty on broadcasters to discuss
both sides of controversial public issues." 7 The Court explicitly
recognized the first amendment goal of keeping the public informed,138 and felt this was best promoted through public knowledge of all political viewpoints:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or by a private licensee
... . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences
139
which is crucial here.
The Court also emphasized the importance of getting that information from the source:
Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and
accompanied by what they offer as refutations. That is not the
way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from
persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest,
and to their very utmost for them. 14 0
iv.

Commercial/Corporate Speech

The right of the public to receive "corporate" information regarding a referendum was at the heart of First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti.14 1 In Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts criminal statute which prohibited specified corporations
from making contributions or expenditures to influence the vote on
any measure before the voters, unless such a measure materially

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
Id. at 392 n.18, (quoting J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 32 (R. McCullum ed. 1947)).
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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affected the business interests of the corporation.' 42 Justice Powell
immediately characterized the proper focus for judicial review of
the statute: not the first amendment rights of corporations as
speakers, but the importance to society of the expression which is
limited by the statute. "The Constitution often protects interests
broader than those of the party seeking their vindication. The
First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests. 14 3 The speech at issue, regarding a public referendum, was
characterized as "the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy." 44 As in Red Lion, the Court explicitly
recognized the structural purpose of the first amendment, 145 as
well as the need to hear debate directly from those who espouse a
particular view: "[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted
with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in making their
judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate."' 46 For those
reasons, the Court concluded that the first amendment "prohibit[s] government from limiting the stock
of information from
1 47
which members of the public may draw."
As the above cases indicate, the Court has recognized in the
first amendment a right of the audience to receive information on
matters of public concern. It is not the job of corporations, the
press, the schools, 4" or even the government itself to limit that
information. Certain speech must be protected, not merely for the
speaker's right of self-expression and self-fulfillment, but more importantly, for the value of the speech to the audience and their
ability to govern themselves. And though the Court has recognized that many types of speech facilitate self-government and
should be afforded first amendment protection, it is speech specifically relating to the operations of government which is most valuable to the receiving public.' 49 The court affords speech the high-

142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 776.

144. Id. at 777.
145. Id. at 776-77.
146. Id. at 791-92.
147. Id. at 783.
148. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872-73 (1982), in which the Court held
that a school board could not remove selected books from a school library based on impermissible criteria, such as personal values, morals, tastes, and political philosophies, rather

than permissible criteria (in the education context) such as educational suitability, relevance, and appropriateness to age and grade level.
149. Cf. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
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est protection when the speech most directly affects the ability to
self-govern. For example, the prior restraint doctrine faced its
greatest challenge in the Pentagon Papers case (and emerged in
its hardiest form), a case involving embarrassing information of
government policy.' 50 In New York Times v. Sullivan, the actual
malice rule replaced less protective state libel laws as a result of
an advertisement critical of Southern law enforcement and racial
policy; 151 and laws prohibiting certain corporate expenditures for
political advocacy were overturned in Bellotti, a case involving a
referendum, an issue "referred" directly to the populace, perhaps
the purest form of legislation available in a republican form of
government.'1 2 Clearly, a "special solicitude" of the public character of government information and, in particular, information
relating to the creation of law and policy, is evident from the Suof cases establishing a public right to repreme Court's analysis
53
ceive information.'
B.

The Functional Advantages of Openness

In addition to looking at the historical aspects of public access to a particular activity, the Court also looks at how openness
can best serve the purposes of that activity. This second, functional prong of the Richmond/Globe test scrutinizes the degree to
which openness acts as a necessary check and balance on government abuse of power, facilitates public scrutiny over the process,
encourages public confidence in the process, aids in fact-finding/
truth-finding, and informs those actually affected by the
54
process.'
1. Openness as a Necessary Check and Balance
Among the founders, Thomas Jefferson most explicitly recognized the need for public access to act as a check on government
abuse of power. Two themes underlie the Jeffersonian concept of
748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). ("In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment
protection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiated from other forms . ...
[These differences] suggest that a different [lesser] degree of protection is necessary to
insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.")
150. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
151. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
152. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
153. For a list of other cases examining the constitutional right to receive information and ideas, see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972).
154. See supra notes 50, 57-62 and accompanying text.
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the use of public discussion and disclosure as a check: to prevent
representatives from making self-interested decisions at the expense of the public interest, and to prevent private interest groups
from asserting undue influence on the deliberative process. 155
Commentators through the years have seized on Jefferson's
model of free expression in explaining the core values of the first
amendment, and applying them to open government. Thomas
Cooley explained:
[The general purpose of the First Amendment was] to guard
against the repressive measures by the several departments of
the government, by means of which persons in power might secure themselves and their favorites from just scrutiny and condemnation .

. .

. The evils to be prevented were not the censor-

ship of the press merely, but any action by the government by
means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters."' 6
Indeed, the Court itself has commented on the critical checking power of an informed citizenry. "Without publicity, all other
checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks
are of small account. ' 157 In the area of legislation, where representatives can be tempted by the advances of private interest to a
much higher degree than the criminal court judge, the checking
power of a public right of access takes on added significance.
2.

Openness to Facilitate Public Scrutiny (in Maintaining
Public Control over the Process)

Though American democracy is most obviously a representative form of government, the ultimate power rests in the people. In
order to maintain control over their governmental institutions, the
people must be able to scrutinize those institutions. As James Wilson commented at the Constitutional Convention, "[t]he people
have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done,
and it should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal
their proceedings." 58

155. Sunstein, supra note 95, at 892.
156. 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 885 (8th ed. 1927), cited in Parks,
The Open Government Principle:Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1957).

157. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 596 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271 (1948)).
158. 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 290-91 (Kurland & Lerner eds. 1987).
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During the drafting and ratification of the Constitution,

many felt that the journal of proceedings clause was not protective
enough of the public's interest. During the Virginia ratification
debates, for example, George Mason rued the requirement that

Congress publish a journal only "from time to time." Mason felt
that the public had a right to know about the receipts and expend-

itures of their money but the journal clause provision "was so
loose, it might be concealed forever from them, and might afford
opportunities of misapplying the public money, and sheltering

those who did it."'159
Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison wrote extensively
on the need for citizens to acquire information about their government. In fact, practically no commentary on a public right of access has been written without the inclusion of the following quote

from Madison: "A popular government, without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or

Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."' 6 °
The need for public scrutiny may be greater today than ever
before. Retired Chief Justice Earl Warren commented on this
fact:
It would be difficult to name a more efficient ally of corruption
than secrecy. Corruption is never flaunted to the world. In government it is invariably practiced through secrecy - secrecy
found in every level of government from city halls to the White
House and Capitol. If anything is to be learned from our present
difficulties, compendiously known as Watergate, it is that we

159.
160.

Id. at 292-93.
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt, ed. 1910), cited in Emerson, ColonialIntentions and the First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 737, 754-55 (1977). Madison also
stated that:
The right of electing members of the government constitutes more particularly
the essence of a free and responsible government. The value and efficacy of this
right depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the
candidates for public trust and on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining
and discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates respectively.
6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON at 398, cited in Note, Access to Official Information: A
Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L. J.209, 217 n.29 (1951) [hereinafter Access to
Official Information]. Ultimately, according to Madison, "[tihe right of freely examining
public characters and measures, and of free communication thereon, is the only effectual
guardian of every other right. Id. at 398. cited in Access to Official Information, supra at
212.
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must open our public affairs to public scrutiny on every level of
government.' 6'
Openness not only inures to the public's benefit in retaining
popular control over government, but it can actually be in a councilman's interest, as well. For example, by knowing only the voting
records of a representative, without the debate and rationale behind each vote, a citizen has a very incomplete and unfair picture
of a representative. This is comparable to evaluating the record of
a judge solely on his holdings, without any review of the opinions
and legal reasoning behind the holdings.
Moreover, the mere publication of the transcript of a meeting
will not suffice. Such a transcript is after-the-fact and can be biased or incomplete. 62 To analogize again to the judiciary, such a
transcript cannot convey the nuances and inflections, the attitudes
and the passions, that can be felt through actual presence. That is
why, for example, an appellate court accords great deference to
the findings of fact of the trial court. Although actual open meetings are often attended only by the press, its presence can serve to
convey a more accurate description of the proceedings than a
transcript: a good reporter will be able to convey to his readers
perceptions of a meeting which are not included in the edited or
even verbatim transcripts. Thus, public meetings, despite the absence of the "laymen public," will facilitate public scrutiny of the
process.
3. Openness Enhances Public Confidence and Encourages
Fact-Finding/Truth-Finding
In an incisive Harvard Law Review note,6 3 many of the important reasons already given here for public access are summarized, such as the insufficiency of official reports of closed meetings, the right of the people to see how their own money is being
spent, and the checking power of the public on government conflicts of interest and misbehavior. However, the author also offers
several other considerations:
Government will be more responsive to the governed if officials
are able to ascertain public reaction to proposed measures. Pub-

lic meetings also may operate to provide officials with more ac161.
162.
163.

Warren, Government Secrecy: Corruption's Ally, 60 A.B.A. J. 550, 550 (1974).
Open Meetings, supra note 28, at 1201.
Id.
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curate information; individual citizens will be able to correct
factual misconceptions, particularly in local government where
the public is apt to have greater knowledge of the issues involved. Then, too, as people better understand the demands of
government and the significance of particular issues, they will be
better prepared "to accept necessary, and perhaps difficult and
unpalatable measures essential to the public good."' 64
The Supreme Court has surmised that openness can improve
the quality of testimony, since the speaker may realize that any
inaccuracies stand a better chance of being discovered through
public attendance and publicity. 6 ' In addition, attendance causes
all participants to perform their duties more conscientiously. 66
Perhaps more importantly, the Court has realized that secrecy breeds distrust, whereas openness breeds confidence. "People
in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited
from observing.' 6 1 Openness both implies that the government is
working in the public's best interest, and rejects the paternalistic
notion that there are some matters about which the public is better off not knowing.
4. Openness Helps to Inform Those Affected by the
Governmental Process
As argued by George Mason during the ratification debates,
legislative meetings should be open to the public due to the direct
impact that such meetings have on citizens as taxpayers. 8 It is
interesting that, the Supreme Court has limited a first amendment
right of access to proceedings in criminal trials, when the core
values of the first amendment - to facilitate and inform public debate on important issues while checking governmental abuses seem most relevant to legislative functions. The right of access to
courtrooms and prisons inure primarily to the rights of citizens to
receive information,16 and only indirectly affects their abilities as
citizens to govern their own affairs through their representatives.
164. Id., (quoting J.

WIGGINs, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 20 (1956)).
L65. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457
U.S. 596, 609 n.26 (1982); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979).
166. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 383.
167. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980).
168. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
169. For a discussion of the Court's protection of the public character of government
information, see supra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
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The requirement of open city meetings, however, is based directly
on the right of the public to know the actions of their elected officials, who govern only by the consent of their constituents. It is
the right of a citizen to know how his tax dollars are being allocated, and how his land is being assessed and zoned. Without such
a right, a public official has no true accountability to his
constituents.
Moreover, the impact of legislative closure upon the citizen is
greater in his relationship with local government than with federal
government. Historically, disclosure of government information
has been opposed for various reasons, perhaps the most compelling
being the need for secrecy in the interest of national military defense and effective foreign relations. 7 0 However, at the local level
of government, many of the compelling reasons for closure disappear. Whatever reasons remain, such as discussion of personnel
matters and real estate transactions, lead to far less dangerous results in the event the information becomes public. Yet the consequences of closure at the local level are more dangerous. The citizen must rely on his own ability to gather information with
regards to local matters, since he does not have the national media
and public advocate groups to acquire information for him. Without a government enforced right to guarantee him access to the
political process, he could be rendered ignorant of the deliberations that most directly affect him.
While judicial access can be distinguished from legislative access, arguments favoring a right of access to judicial proceedings,
yet denying access to legislative meetings, are flawed. The notion
that the citizen, barred from a local town meeting, has a political
remedy on election day misses the point. Such a citizen cannot
make an intelligent decision on whom to re-elect when he has no
1 1
idea how and why his representatives voted on specific issues.
The other alternative, a blanket decision to vote out all incumbents in closed governments, is hardly a good solution. Not only is
it unfair to those representatives who were against closure, it is
hardly supportive of assuring a competent local government,
staffed with at least some experienced councilmen.
In applying the Richmond/Globe test to local legislative

170. Parks, supra note 156, at 5; Sunstein, supra note 95, at 895-96.
Despite such compelling federal interests in closure, both houses of Congress have
been open to reporters since 1792. Seibert, supra note 98, at 58-59.
171. Access to Official Information, supra note 146, at 216-17.
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meetings, it is clear that openness promotes the purposes of honest
and informed municipal legislation, and therefore fulfills the functional prong for public access. Although that in itself should be
reason to articulate a constitutional presumption of openness,
openness also serves a structural purpose not merely in the functioning of local meetings, but in the democratic process of government as a whole.
C. The Structural Role of Open Legislative Meetings in the
Democratic Process
The structural argument for public access recognizes that in
order for citizens to be able to govern themselves competently in
their political affairs, they need to be knowledgeable about how
their government operates; the more information they have, the
better equipped they are to govern. Conversely, the more ignorant
a populace, the greater the risk that the wrong choices will be
made concerning representation and referendum, and that governmental abuse (be it legislative, judicial, or executive) will go unrecognized, be tolerated, or even encouraged.
Like his Secretary of State, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson emphasized the central importance of information to democracy. Though he advocated a more direct role for the citizen in
the decision-making process than Madison or, ultimately, the
Constitutional Convention, 7 2 Jefferson's views on the importance
of an informed public have helped define the popular understanding of the function of the first amendment.173 Under his approach,
democratic government functions through widespread public deliberations on important issues; for intelligent decision making, the
1 4
public must be informed:
The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people,
the very first object should be to keep that right. The way to
prevent [errors of] the people, is to go give them full information
of their affairs through the channel of the public papers, and to
contrive that these papers should penetrate the whole mass of
the people.1"5

172.
173.
174.

Sunstein, supra note 95, at 890, n.7.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 891.

175.

H.

LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND

INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

62 (1950)

(quoting Thomas Jefferson cited in Access to Official Information, supra note 160, at 212,
n.11.
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These sentiments have been developed further by such commentators as Professor Alexander Meiklejohn:
Just so far as . . . the citizens who are to decide an issue are

denied acquaintance with information or doubt or disbelief or
criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result
must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning, for the general
good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of community
against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is
directed."'
Some commentators seeking to limit first amendment protection in other areas have nonetheless emphasized the self-government role of certain speech. Meiklejohn himself stated, "[t]he
First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern'. It is concerned, not with a private
right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility."17
Even Judge Robert Bork, not known for liberal constitutional interpretations, emphasized the necessity of first amendment protection of political debate, since, "a representative democracy [is] a
form of government that would be meaningless without freedom
to discuss government and its policies. Freedom for political
speech could ' and
should be inferred even if there were no First
78
Amendment.'
Congress has acknowledged the imperative value of public
governmental information in justifying passage of the Federal
Sunshine Act,' 79 as well as the Freedom of Information Act. 80

176. A.

MEIKLEJOHN,

supra note 118, at 26 (1948), cited in Houchins v. KQED,

Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 31 n.21 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245,
255, cited in Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.

1, 26 (1971).
178.

Bork, supra note 177, at 23.

179. See S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975), in explaining passage of 5
U.S.C. § 552b:
[T]his bill should enhance greatly the public's understanding of the decisions
reached by the government ....
[U]p to now the public has not had a full

opportunity to learn how or why government official [sic] make the important
policy decisions which they do. All too often the meetings at which such decisions are made are closed to the public. Interested persons must content themselves with elementary minutes, or background papers tangentially related to the
official agenda. Formal statements in support of agency actions are frequently
too brief, or too general, to fully explain the Commission's reasoning, or the
compromises that were made. As a result, the public may not understand the
reasons an agency has acted in a certain way, or even what exactly it has de-
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Yet some kinds of information may be more critical to democratic
citizens than other kinds. We are indeed a nation of laws, and it is
the role of government to promulgate, interpret and enforce those
laws. If knowledge and open debate of government matters is critical to democracy, then surely the most essential knowledge and
debate is that which pertains to the origin and rationale behind
the law itself. In short, the knowledge most fundamental to democracy is legislative knowledge.
There has been a dearth of commentary regarding a constitutional right of access to government meetings. The reason is
plainly the proliferation of state open meetings, or sunshine laws
that originally seemed to negate the necessity of arguing about a
constitutional right of access. In reality, the state remedies have
proven to be inadequate.' 8 1 Yet, in order to defend a right completely central to democratic self-government, federal and constitutional law must be expressly available to guarantee the exercise
of this constitutional right.
III.

ADVANTAGES OF ENFORCING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

OF ACCESS

There are certainly some well-written state open-meeting
statutes that are effectively enforced in the state courts. But other
statues often lack clarity, vision, or a real commitment to the public's right of access.
One common problem is a lack of precision in the language
of the state laws. A recurrent example is the definition of "meeting" itself. Absent precise language as to the legislature's intent,
state courts are often left to come up with their own definition of
the word. Frequently, these definitions restrict the public's interest
82
more than the plain language of the statute.
Another problem related to the lack of clarity is the use of
enumerated exceptions to the state laws which allow deliberative
bodies to go into closed, or executive, sessions. Common exceptions include discussions of personnel matters, conduct of official
investigations or preparation for pending litigation, and discus-

cided to do ....
180. The Freedom of Information Act is now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982).
181. See infra notes 182-97 and accompanying text.
182. See e.g., Note, Entering the Door Opened: An Evolution of Rights of Public
Access to Governmental Deliberationsin Louisiana and a Plea For Realistic Remedies, 41
LA. L. REv. 192, 198, n.32 (1980) [hereinafter Public Access].
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259

sions involving real estate transactions.183 Though in theory these
exceptions are necessary to protect important privacy and economic interests, they can be exploited by local governments as

loopholes for avoiding public scrutiny. The following two examples
illustrate this point:
1. The Mississippi Open Meetings Law,184 like most open
meetings laws, contains an exception for the discussion of "personnel matters. 1 5 A Mississippi lower court stated that the exception could apply to discussions of insurance, holidays, parking
spaces and architects. 8 However, this broad exception was later
narrowed somewhat by the Mississippi Supreme Court even
though they held that "personnel matters" still covers a large sub-

18 7
ject area.
2. The New York Open Meetings Law 88 contains an exception allowing for closed "deliberations of political committees,

183. Wickham, Let the Sunshine In! Open Meeting Legislation Can Be Our key to
Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 480, 485-86 (1973).
184. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 25-41-1 to 25-41-17 (Supp. 1989).
185. MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-7(4)(a) (Supp. 1989).
186. Common Cause v. Minds County Bd. of Supervisors, No. 118, 538 (Minds Co.
Ch. Ct. First Dist. August 18, 1986), rev'd in part, Minds County Bd. of Supervisors v.
Common Cause, No. 58177, 1989 WL 76443 (Ms. June 28, 1989).
187. Minds County Bd. of Supervisors v. Common Cause, No. 58177, 1989 WL
76443 (Miss. June 28, 1989). In dicta, the Mississippi Supreme Court subsequently narrowed the chancellor's broad reading of "personal matters":
The authorization to go into executive session to discuss "personnel matters," of
course embraces a large area of subject matter. Obviously, however, there is any
number of matters of discussion involving the employees of an organization
which would never require an executive session. Commendations, need to work
overtime upon occasion, shift in hours of employment, increase in life insurance,
any of these might very well come under the heading of "personnel matters," but
they are hardly the stuff for which a board would trouble itself to go into executive session.
Id.
The court did hold that a decision on whether to retain an architect is not a personnel
matter:
We have no difficulty holding that the words "personnel matters" are restricted
to matters dealing with employees hired and supervised by the board, not those
employees of some other county official, and not other county officials themselves
....
Moreover, an independent contractor such as an accountant, lawyer, or
architect is not an employee of the board, and would not come under
"personnel".

Id.
The court found it unnecessary to define exactly what encompasses personnel matters,
since the county board in question neglected to even announce the reason for going into
executive session, and to take competent minutes to show that discussion remained focused
on the appropriate matters. Id.
188. N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW §§ 100-111 (McKinney 1988).
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conferences and caucuses."1 9 In the statute's original form, the
presence of a quorum in a political caucus meeting fell outside the
exception, unless the discussion focused on political party matters.
The New York state legislators soon realized this meant that their
own political caucuses could be opened to the public if they discussed public business, so they amended the statute. Now, any political caucus can meet in closed session, regardless of whether or
not it contains a governmental quorum, and regardless of whether
it discusses party business or public business. Such a loophole permits local legislative bodies to meet behind closed doors. 9
Another drawback of open meetings statutes is the lack of
effective enforcement procedures. Since the common law did not
recognize a public right of access, there are no judicially developed remedies available. 9" Statutory remedies have included
criminal sanctions against offending officials, nullification of the
legislation passed in secret, civil relief, and removal from office.' 92
Yet all of the statutory remedies are found wanting. In practice,
criminal sanctions, though the most common statutory remedy,
are rarely if ever imposed. 3 Legislatures have failed to include
meaningful standards for determining what qualify as criminal violations,' and courts are hesitant to provide them. Either the
criminal sanction would have to be a strict liability crime, and
therefore carry with it a penalty too small to be effective, or it
would have to depend on a showing of intent or bad faith, which is
always difficult to prove. Also, criminal sanctions are left to the
discretion of district attorneys who might be loathe to prosecute
fellow local officials. 95 Nullification offers no better solution because it can be negated simply by re-run votes.' 96
Removal from office is the least prevalent of enforcement
remedies. To be effective, removal would also have to be a strict
liability punishment (for instance, two violations could suffice for
removal); the severity of such a sanction may be why it has not

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
at 212-14.

N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 108(2)(a) (McKinney 1988).
Sluzar, supra note 10, at 613, 622-624.
Wickham, supra note 183, at 495.
Id. at 496-99.
Id. at 496.
Id.
Public Access, supra note 182, at 207 & n.94.
See Wickham, supra note 183, at 496-98; Note, Public Access, supra note 182,

1989-901

LOCAL LEGISLATIVE MEETINGS

garnered more support in the state legislatures.197
A constitutional right of public access could overcome many
of the drawbacks of the state statutes. For instance, unclear language becomes a problem when state courts interpret the statutory language too narrowly, or the exceptions too broadly, to the
detriment of the public interest. This is understandable, since the
state courts do not have an articulated valuation of the public's
right of access. Thus, in balancing the values between a vague
conception of the worth of open meetings against the concrete
supplications of governmental bodies in seeking closure, where the
statutory language gives any leeway, the courts often decide in
favor of the government bodies. Recognition of a constitutional
right of access would provide the courts with the bedrock valuation of the public's right to open government.
Moreover, a constitutional right of access would close the
loopholes provided by unclear language and overbroad exceptions
by mandating the application of the Richmond/Globe strict scrutiny test.'98 Using such a test, the state would not only have to
show a compelling interest in closure (such as personnel, litigation, or real estate matters), but would have to prove that no
means less restrictive than closure were available. This is not to
say that every time a city council wants to meet in executive session, it has to go to court to justify the closure. Certainly, the
body of constitutional law will develop appropriate standards, so
that certain reasons for closure will be known as acceptable,
thereby aborting any such suits. Moreover, in a strict scrutiny
framework, overbroad exceptions such as general employee policy
discussions, absent named individuals, would fall out of the range
of permissible exceptions.
Another common loophole for local governments is the executive session which begins by discussing an enumerated exception,
but then turns to other public business not covered by the exceptions clause. Currently, to enforce sanctions against this type of
behavior after the fact, if it were even attempted by a plaintiff,
would require deposing the city officials involved. A much less intrusive method for requiring a city government body to confine
themselves to the excepted subject matter, is to require audio or
videotaping of all closed sessions. 199 In this age of rampant video
197. See Wickham, supra note 182, at 499 n.99.
198.
199.

See supra notes 41-77 and accompanying text.
The Federal Sunshine Act allows for closed meeting transcripts or minutes that
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consumerism, such a requirement would neither tax a city's treasury nor hinder their deliberative processes. Of course, closed sessions in any event would be the exception to the rule. But in almost all instances, the tape of the closed session would remain
securely in the hands of the city, since most closed sessions would
occur without a constitutional challenge. However, in the event of
litigation over the matter, the city could submit the tape to the
judge for in camera inspection. If the closed session was confined
to the proper subject matter, the city would win the lawsuit and
retain possession of the tape. If other public business is discussed,
however, the judge would have the discretion to release those portions to the public in an edited version of the tape. In camera
inspection is one proven method of assuring that first amendment
rights are protected while other compelling interests are also
served. 00° Such an application would assure that the public's right
to access has not been exploited, while also protecting the important privacy and economic interests of the city without noticeable
intrusion by the federal or state judiciary.
Despite the advantages of a constitutional presumption of
public access, a city council may still not feel compelled to open
its doors if it feels that no one will take the expense and trouble of
challenging it in court. In fact, perhaps the greatest weakness of
most state open- meetings law is their failure to provide for attorney's fees for the private plaintiff, absent a showing of bad faith
on the part of the government. The cost of litigation has deterred
local newspapers and broadcasting companies, the most likely
plaintiffs, from bringing suit in many instances. 01
Congress, however, has determined that any person who has
been deprived of a constitutional right, by a person acting under
color of state law, has a private federal cause of action and,
among other statutory and common law remedies, can recover attorney's fees. In Monroe v. Pape,2 °2 the Supreme Court held that
a section 1983203 action gave a remedy to any individual deprived

the public can obtain if the transcripts do not contain exempt information. 5 U.S.C. §
552b(f) (1988).
200. E.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150
(7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (court suggests in camera viewing of documents to strike a
balance between first amendment interest in association and need for discovery).
201. Conversation with Susan Gillis, on October 27, 1988, first amendment lawyer
for the law firm of Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, Ohio.
202. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states:
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of constitutional rights by an official's abuse of his position, regardless of whether that official was abiding by or violating state
law. Monell v. Department of Social Services20 4 broadened the
class of permissible section 1983 defendants to include corporate
municipalities. Hence, if a constitutional right of public access to
local government were recognized, section 1983 would allow a private party, barred from a meeting, to sue the city officials and/or
the city itself.
An after-the-fact suit brought under section 1983 would
probably seek only declaratory judgment against the city, since
money damages, though available in section 1983 action, would be
too difficult to calculate in this type of action.20 5 However, such a
suit could include recovery for attorney's fees for the plaintiffs,
since section 1988206 gives the judge discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a section 1983 action.2 °7
Since section 1983 is not a cause of action exclusive to federal courts, the states can choose to entertain such suits. 20 8 Hence,
the fear that recognition of the constitutional presumption of public access will give the federal courts too much power in the affairs
of local government is somewhat mitigated. Also, the federal
courts have discretion themselves to send a case to the state
courts, utilizing the Pullman abstention doctrine to avoid the constitutional issue if the state statute could decide the case.2 0 9 However, the plaintiff in such a case would reserve the right to have

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
204. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
205. But cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding an illegal search and seizure by
federal agents, in violation of fourth amendment rights, capable of judicial determination
of meaningful compensation).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title. . . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs.")
207. Congress created a public right to sue, and to win attorneys fees, for violations
by the Government in the Sunshine Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552b(h)(1), (i) (1988).
208. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-84 & n.7 (1980).
209. Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (where a state law
is ambiguous but its interpretation could negate the need to proceed to a constitutional
issue federal courts should direct the state issue to the state court for adjudication).
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the federal claim litigated later in federal court.2 10
Of course, articulating a constitutional right of public access
to local legislative meetings requires a definition of what is meant
by the word "meeting" in the constitutional context. Choices
range from any communication concerning public business between two or more legislators, to a quorum meeting of a city council in which a vote takes place.
The problems in defining the word "meeting" can be seen in
articles analyzing state sunshine laws"' and the federal Sunshine
Act. " ' Section 552b(a)(2) of the Sunshine Act defines a "meeting" as "the deliberations of at least the number of individual
agency members required to take action on behalf of the agency
where such deliberations determine or result in the joint conduct
or disposition of official agency business. 212 As it applies to
agency committees, the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute
to apply only "where a subdivision of the agency deliberates upon

matters that are within the subdivision's formally delegated authority to take official action for the agency."2

4

Though the Court

was engaged in statutory, not constitutional, interpretation, the focus upon the authority to take legal action is appropriate in appli-

cation to local legislative bodies. Through such a focus, a quorum
of a city council would be obligated to open its doors to the public,

210. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417
(1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)) ("[A] party has the right to
return to the District Court, after obtaining the authoritative state court construction for
which the court abstained, for a final determination of his claim.").
211. See, e.g., McKee, The Amended Open Meetings Law: New Requirements for
Publicly Funded Corporations as Well as Governmental Agencies, 25 GA. ST. B.J. 78, 79
(Nov. 1988) ("A covered meeting is defined as 'the gathering of a quorum of the members
of the governing body' of a covered entity or 'any committee of its members' 'at which
official business or policy' is to be discussed or 'at which official action is to be taken,' or, in
the case of a committee, 'recommendations on official business or policy' are formulated or
discussed'."); McManus, Meetings and Records in Illinois: How Open Are They, 77 ILL.
B.J. 156, 156 (Nov. 1988) ("Originally, the Act required only that 'official meetings' at
which 'legal action' was to be taken must be open. The amendment required that both the
'deliberations' and 'actions' be open and eliminated the references to 'official' meetings and
to 'legal' actions."); PublicAccess, supra note 182, at 198-202 & n.32 ("While rejecting a
broad reading of 'meeting,' the [Louisiana Supreme C]ourt also refused a wooden and
formalistic construction, reasoning that administrative 'conference sessions' could not 'be
held without compliance with the Public Meetings law.'" (citations omitted)).
212. See, Note, FacilitatingGovernment Decision Making: Distinguishing Meetings
and Nonmeetings Under the Federal Sunshine Act, 66 Tax. L. REv. 1195 (1988) [hereinafter Decision Making].
213. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2) (1988).
214. FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 472 (1984).
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since that body would have authority to take almost any action
not limited by the city charter or state constitution. Conversely,
meetings of city council subcommittees would not be constitutionally compelled to provide public access. However, such subcommittee hearings, findings, and reports should be provided to the
public in the event that it is used as evidence at a vote of the
entire city council. Once a matter moves from committee to the
entire council, the public must be allowed to attend. At that point,
the committee's findings and recommendations will be presented
and debated in front of the whole legislative body; the public will
have the opportunity to scrutinize the process, provide a check
upon the intrusion of private interest in the debates, add comment
to the proceedings, and help ensure against inaccuracies in the deliberations. Thus, even though the public will initially miss out on
important information in committee, it will learn of the information as it is presented to the entire body, and it will still effectively
participate in the legislative process. The functional and structural
roles of public access will be fulfilled.
In addition, restricting a constitutional right of access to quorums of the legislative body will be more easily enforceable, and
will allow the courts to avoid constant line drawing on a case by
case basis of whether a particular subcommittee meeting should
be open. It does not mandate that all subcommittee meetings
should be closed, however; it leaves that decision to the state legislatures, who are free to expand upon the basic constitutional
rights.21 5 Admittedly, such a rule could be abused through such
techniques as splintering the quorum; 210 however, in that instance,
the existence of a pre-determined decision might be evident at the
subsequent open meeting, which then could be countered through
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Such a constitutional rule of access might help to alleviate the fears of critics

such as Archibald Cox:
Drawing new lines for the Legislative and Executive Branches between what

must be open and what may be closed is unsuited to judicial determination ....
In the end, therefore, the only protection of the people against excessive government secrecy is the people's own active insistence on disclosure, expressed by
their votes and the legislative action of their representatives. The Freedom of
Information Act, though subject to many exceptions, is an example.
A. Cox, supra note 95, at 233-34. The rule mandating openness for bodies authorized to
take legal action is not susceptible to constant and intrusive line drawing, but puts the city

on notice of when access is required. In addition, Professor Cox's reliance on the vote to
protect the public interest loses its force when applied to closed local meetings, since the

public cannot know how to use their votes effectively. See supra notes 168-71.
216.

See Decision Making, supra note 212, at 1203 n.51.
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adverse publicity and election returns.
Some commentators advocate an even narrower construction
of "meeting," so that preliminary "collective inquiry" gatherings
can be closed, while later "deliberative" and "decisional" meetings would be open.2 17 Theoretically, at the collective inquiry
stage, information is gathered, expertise gained, and possible solutions identified but not compared.2 18 Openness at this stage, the
critics argue, would expose disagreements among subordinates regarding policy determinations; create a public image of ignorance
through searching questions, producing demagogic oratory; hamper collegial decision making through the fear of benefiting special
interests; invite pressure from special interests; and freeze members into policy opinions that they might prefer to abandon since a
change in position could appear as a weak-willed backing down in
the face of pressure.219 In addition, openness could cause the decision makers to simplify and trivialize public discourse, boiling it
down to two-sided, rather than multi-sided, issues.220
Most of these arguments are more applicable at the federal
agency level. Because legislatures generally are not bound by the
policy mandates of a superior body, subordinate disagreements are
usually irrelevant. The fear of appearing ignorant, or of trivializing matters for public understanding, is also irrelevant. For the
most part, local legislators are not "experts", therefore, they are
at the same level as the public, and have no need to simplify matters for public consumption.
Openness has been clearly acknowledged as a check against
special interests. This was recognized early on by the Founding
Fathers.221 The greater the audience, the more the power of special interest will be diluted in the competition with other factions.
Certainly, fears of appearing ignorant or weak through compromise are of little significance when balanced against the public's
need for information, and public attendance can provide useful
comment and information that could help to alleviate a legislator's
real ignorance. The practice of an open Congress has proven that
legislators can ask simple questions, and can change positions or
remain publicly undecided until just before a vote without com-
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Id. at 1205.
Id.
Id. at 1209 n.85 & 1211.
Id.at 1211.
See supra notes 155-58 accompanying text.
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promising effectiveness.
Moreover, rules that limit public access to the moment when
discussion becomes decision-oriented are simply unenforceable. As
the commentators admit, collective inquiry, where knowledge of
an issue expands, often overlaps with deliberation, where issues
are narrowed and alternatives discarded.2 22 Such a process will
necessarily vary depending on the individual legislator and the issues. In some situations, a majority might have their minds made
up immediately upon the introduction of an issue, even before all
the relevant facts are gathered. Such hair-splitting is even more
problematic when the issues involve the formulation of government policy, rather than the enactment of laws. Since policy is
more abstract and may not even be articulated in a published format, or voted upon, a determination of policy could occur at almost any stage of the decision-making process, and could even
play a part in the collective inquiry stage of more particularized
legislation. Since the formulation of government policy can be as
important to the public as actual legislation, the public must be
afforded access to all meetings of a legislative quorum.
Enforcing a constitutional right of access to legislative meetings would guarantee that the public play its critical role in the
legislative process, and acquire the proper information to be competent self-governors. The right would guarantee public access to
all quorums of city council meetings unless the meetings fell
within certain enumerated exceptions. Even then, safeguards, such
as transcripts, would ensure that discussions remain focused on
those exceptions. The constitutional right would not conflict with
state sunshine laws, but would complement them: the states would
be free to grant their citizens even greater access than that guaranteed by the constitution. Moreover, a constitutional right would
give state judges the proper weight to allot to the public interest
when balancing it against interests in closure; this would provide
for more consistent and understandable interpretations of state
statutes. This right would give every citizen in the country the
freedom to attend local meetings, the opportunity to influence how
his tax dollars are allocated, and the right to ask the courts to
enforce that freedom.

222. Id. at 1205-06. The author concedes that if enforcement of a restriction of
openness to the deliberate process is to be effective, "[t]he day to day realities of administering the affected agencies require the agency members themselves to be the primary enforcers of the [Sunshine] Act's requirements." Id. at 1225.
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CONCLUSION

For all practical purposes, a constitutional right of public access to local government meetings has already been recognized.
The language of the Founding Fathers, of commentators through
the years, both liberal and conservative, and of the Supreme
Court declares that an informed populace, free to debate important public issues, is essential to the functioning of our government. Without allowing the public the right to attend local legislative deliberations, the glue which holds our democracy together
turns to grease.
The fact that every state has an open meetings law points to
the consensus of a need for a public right of access. But the existence of these laws has not guaranteed the exercise of that right.
Many of the laws are of recent vintage: thirty of them are less
than thirty years old, and of those, many were drafted as a response to Watergate and the growing distrust of government in
the early 1970s.223 The laws were commendable attempts by the
states to clean up their own messes, just as Congress passed laws
at the federal level, such as the Freedom of Information Act, to
put its own house in order. Commentators and the courts restrained themselves from advocating the expansion of the first
amendment right of access doctrine, as they turned their attention
elsewhere and waited to see how the state sunshine experiments
fared.
The state laws have created a climate where the public, and
in particular the media, are aware of their rights. Likewise, the
local governing bodies are aware of their constraints. Unfortunately, they are also aware of the loopholes to get around those
constraints. Despite these loopholes, however, procedures have
been put into place, courts have responded, and the nation knows
the rules - except in special instances, it is illegal to close local
governmental meetings to the public.
It is time to take the next step. At this point, articulation by
the judiciary of a constitutional right of public access will not
come as the shock it would have twenty or thirty years ago. Articulation will allow a constitutional standard to be applied by state
courts when balancing the public's interest against the state's. Articulation will protect the public's interest in the face of weak
open meetings statutes due to lack of clarity or the self-interest of
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Wickham, supra note 183, at 184-85.
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the state legislature. Articulation will allow the normal federal
remedies to be applied when a state body acts to deprive a party
of its constitutional rights. As was Congress' intent, such remedies
will encourage plaintiffs to come forward and press their claims.
Such remedies will guarantee that a republican form of open government will flourish in the states.
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